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We survey the rich literature studying the behaviour of labor shares in recent decades. To explain 
their dynamics – the main feature being the decline of European and American shares starting in 
the 1980s – such literature considers models that use either neoclassical or Leontief-type 
production functions, with both perfectly competitive markets and monopolistic competition 
coupled by bargaining between firms and workers. These empirical studies in general have 
produced results that are scarcely robust. However, they suggest that technical change has a 
negative and significant impact on the labor share. Evidence for a negative effect of globalization 
variables is clearly brought out for developing countries, whilst for advanced countries, this effect 
finds less support. Also, they show that product and labor market regulation issues have mixed 
effects on the labor share. An alternative to the econometric explanation of labor share is given in 
the final section. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The functional distribution of income, which in the 1950s and 1960s was the subject of very 
intense debates, and thereafter fell into relative neglect
2 is well expressed in the following sentence 
by Mark Blaug: ‘the great mystery of the modern theory of distribution is why anyone regards the 
share of wages and profits as an interesting problem’ (Blaug, 1996, p. 467).
3 
The present research on the income share of wages (and profits) was motivated by the desire 
to understand some important developments in their behavior, with the belief that the division of 
national income between labor and non labor incomes still gives a synthetic, though crude, idea of 
some fundamental dimensions of income distribution. Therefore, it matters to people. 
Their behavior is described in detail in this survey, and the relevant literature is surveyed 
and assessed. 
The main fact about the dynamics of European and American total labor shares from 1970 
(1977 for US) to 2005 (Figure 1) is a declining trend
4 which started in the 1980s both in the EU15 
(-0,2%) and in the US. It is much less severe (-0,08%), with a clear bump centred in 2000 in the 
latter case (Figure 3), whilst in the former an upward shift in the 1970s is clearly noticeable. In 
manufacturing, the US labor share dropped much more than the European one, while the reverse is 
true for the market economy labor share.
5 
As for the theoretical explanations of these and other aspects of the behavior of labor shares, 
we begin by considering the neoclassical approach, in particular the one-to-one relationship 
between capital/output ratio and labor share as developed by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) under 
the assumption of perfectly competitive markets for products and markets. Then models with 
monopolistic competition in the market for goods and services and with bargaining between firms 
and workers in the labor market – using either neoclassical or a Leontief-type production function – 
are presented. 
The effects of labor market regulations on labor share, the globalization process and 
technology-policy interaction are also examined. Unfortunately, in spite of its relevance, a clear 
theoretical relationship between international trade and labor share movements, going beyond the 
traditional and hardly satisfying Heckscher-Ohlin theory, turn out difficult to find. 
                                                 
2 This fact is well described in Atkinson (2009) p. 4. 
3 Atkinson’s paper is devoted to giving good reasons to assert that such a problem is indeed interesting. According to him (p.5) – following Glyn 
(2009) – there are three reasons for studying factor shares: “to make a link between incomes at the macroeconomic level (national accounts) and 
incomes at the level of the household; to help understand inequality in the personal distribution of income; to address the concern of social justice 
with the fairness of different sources of income.” 
4 A measure of trend (a yearly average percentage change) is obtained by regressing the logarithm of each series with a constant against time. 
5 Many other facts related to the labor shares are described in Section 4.1.   3
In the final part of the paper, the very diverse results of the empirical studies are surveyed 
and summarized. We find that technical change has a negative and significant impact on the labor 
share. Evidence for a negative effect of globalization variables is clearly brought out for developing 
countries, whilst for advanced countries, this effect finds less support, possibly because of a ten-
year lag between the beginning of labor share’s declining trend and the rising trend of globalization. 
Finally, product and labor market regulation issues have mixed effects on the labor share.  
In Section 2, labor share measurement problems are discussed, while theories on its 
determination are analyzed in Section 3. Section 4.1 gives a detailed overview of the main facts 





2  Measuring the Labor Share 
 
2.1  Measurement Problems 
 
Measuring labor share is not straightforward despite the definition derived from the theory is 
quite simple; it is the ratio between employee compensation and value added. Two sets of issues in 
fact arise: definition and data related issues. 
First, there are problems with the notion of employee compensation. What exactly must be 
included within this definition is unclear as noted by Krueger (1999). A relevant question is posed 
by the fact that the economic definition of labor share does not coincide with the aggregate income 
paid out to labor. This variable includes the effects of human capital accumulation; but labor share 
is properly defined as the share of production which rewards ''raw'' units of labor
6. It is thus 
questionable to use employee compensation in the computation of the labor share. 
A second issue involves the definition of employees whose boundaries are unclear. Consider 
for instance CEOs and business owners: how much of their income should be imputed to capital and 
how much to labor? Furthermore, some income earned by proprietors (i.e., owners of 
unincorporated businesses) is labor income, while some represents a return on investments. 
Available data also exhibit a number of problems. National Income and Product Accounts 
(NIPA) which are the main sources of data, adopt different accounting procedures in different 
countries. Moreover, these procedures respond more to administrative convenience than to 
                                                 
6 See Young and Zuleta (2008).   4
economic rationale. Consequently, relevant issues are discarded by the data collection system and a 
bias in the measurements of both employee compensation and total value added is introduced. 
Gollin (2002) argues that most of the observed cross-countries differences in data derive in fact 
from an incorrect measurement of employee compensation. This depends on a number of factors 
listed below:  
•  Self-employment 
•  Non-wage compensation 
•  Payments to retirees 
•  Aggregation 
•  Government sector and indirect taxes 
•  Housing sector  
Most of the bias in the calculation of employee compensation depends on self-employment. 
The earnings of self-employed workers which are known as mixed income, vary considerably 
across countries and are not included in employee compensation. They are falsely considered 
capital income.  
Stock options are the main form of non-wage compensation and usually are not imputed to 
the labor share either, mostly because national accounts don't keep track of them. Their nature as 
labor earnings moreover is debated. 
Payments to retirees are troublesome for two reasons. One is that the accounting system records 
delayed labor compensation only when an effective disbursement takes place. This usually happens 
after the money has been earned. A major example is that of retiree health benefits. A second 
problem arises with respect to employer contributions to the pension system which are recorded by 
the NIPA at time of payment, if under- or overfunded defined benefit plans are in place. 
Further distortions derive from the aggregation of data from different sectors. As pointed out 
by De Serres et al. (2001) changes in the sectorial composition of the economy might produce an 
aggregation bias when labor shares vary significantly across sectors. An observed decline in the 
aggregate variable, thus, might depend both on increased wage moderation within most sectors or 
on the growth (decline) of low (high) wage sectors. 
The sectorial composition of the economy matters also for the last two points listed above. 
Government and housing sectors are opposite examples of how difficult it is to separate labor and 
capital contributions in the national accounts. 
In the government sector, there is no capital income and value added is the sum of wage, 
salary income and fixed capital consumption. Including the government sector in the calculation of 
total output, biases labor share upwards, because government capital income is missing. Yet,   5
excluding the governement sector raises other problems. The value added absorbed by the 
government, i.e. indirect taxes less subsidies, should be coherently imputed either to the labor or to 
the capital share of output, but this apportioning is not easily done. 
The NIPA records the rents of owner-occupied housing as capital income and does not 
impute any labor income. If the housing sector is considered in output calculations, labor share is 
biased downwards because the labor component of owner-occupied housing is omitted. 
Also, the measurement of gross value added is troublesome. The informal economy in fact is 
a major source of errors. Transactions which are not recorded by the NIPA vary greatly across 
countries and heavily affect international comparisons. The business cycle moreover affects the size 
of the informal economy and biases the analyses based on time series. 
A more fundamental issue deals with the appropriate income measure to be used in the 
calculation of the labor share. It is debated whether capital depreciation should be included in total 
output or not: in the former case, we have gross value added; in the latter, net value added. Net 
value added might be preferred because depreciation merely compensates owners for the wear and 
tear of their capital. Nonetheless, intellectual labor is also subject to wear and tear, but its 
depreciation is not considered in the calculation of net value added. This provides a justification for 
using gross value added as a measure of actual income. 
 
2.2  Proposed Solutions 
 
Most of the measurement problems pointed out depend on data quality and do not leave 
much room for possible solutions. For some of them, however, the literature has proposed sensible 
procedures to adjust actual data. Gollin (2002) for instance discusses different solutions for the 
problem posed by self employment. 
The best approach to the problem is proposed by Young (1995) and entails imputing a 
notional wage to self-employed workers depending on sector, sex, age, and education. This 
procedure, however, is troublesome because it requires control over unobservable differences in 
entrepreneurial ability and relies on detailed micro data. Alternative adjustments have been 
proposed by Gollin (2002) based on the reported operating surplus of private unincorporated 
enterprises (OSPUE). Self-employed income coincides with the OSPUE unless the worker is paid a 
wage by his/her own enterprise or unless individuals incorporate their own enterprises. Three 
methods are proposed for reallocating OSPUE between labor and capital. 
First, a simple procedure treats the OSPUE as labor income and relies on the assumption 
that self-employed workers supply only labor and no capital. This circumstance is hardly observed   6
even in developing countries, implying that the labor share is overestimated. The adjusted labor 
share is defined as follows: 
  ) )/( ( xes IndirectTa GDP OSPUE mpensation EmployeeCo − +  
A second method takes into account both capital and labor income and relies on the 
assumption that unincorporated enterprises adopt the same mix of labor and capital income as the 
rest of the economy. The relative factor shares coincide with those of large corporations and of the 
government sector. The main drawback to this approach is that it treats enterprises which are 
different in size and structure, and sectors whose number of unincorporated enterprises varies 
significantly in the same way. This might result in an incorrect apportioning of the OSPUE 
especially because unincorporated enterprises are usually characterized by higher labor intensity 
than corporations. The adjusted labor share is defined as follows: 
  ) )/( ( OSPUE xes IndirectTa GDP mpensation EmployeeCo − −  
Third, the most popular correction to data is based on the assumption that the wage of self-
employed workers equals the average compensation per employee. The adjusted labor share is 
defined as follows: 
  ( ) ValueAdded mpensation EmployeeCo Employees yment TotalEmplo )/ ( ) / ( ⋅  
This adjustment allows to account for the different size of self-employment in different 
countries, but it is reliable only if self-employed workers command the same wages as employees. 
Gomme and Rupert (2004) propose a method of categorizing proprietors' income and 
indirect taxes less subsidies. It relies on a classification of income among: 
•  Unambiguous labor income (compensation of employees), 
UL Y . 
•  Unambiguous capital income (corporate profits, rental income, net interest income, 
and depreciation), 
UK Y . 
•  Ambiguous income (proprietors' income plus indirect taxes less subsidies), 
A Y .  
Ambiguous income in this approach is apportioned between labor and capital using the same 
proportions calculated for the remainder of the economy. Let a (yet undetermined) denote labor's 
share of income; then, total labor income, 
L Y , is given by:  
 
A UL L aY Y Y + =  
Since a is labor's share of gross value added, Y , it is the case that:  
  ( )
UK A UL L Y Y Y a aY Y + + = = 
 Substituting 
L Y  in the first equation and solving a provides the adjusted labor share:  










3  Determinants of Labor Share Movements 
 
The present section considers the determinants of labor share dynamics and distinguishes 
between two different approaches to the problem. The first is based on the definition of the so called 
SK schedule proposed by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) whose analysis relies on the assumption 
that the production function allows for factor substitution (at least in the long run). The second 
approach considers the case where capital and labor are strict complement. The literature in this 
field focuses primarily on the effects of globalization excluding those depending on international 
trade. International trade of goods and services in fact raises important interpretative issues which 
need to be discussed in detail. A review of the literature dealing with this last aspect is reported in 
the final part of this section. 
 
3.1  A Neoclassical Approach to the Analysis of the Labor Share: the SK  Schedule 
 
The determinants of labor share in the long-run general equilibrium, are described by 
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003). These authors prove the existence of a one-to-one relation between 
the labor share and the capital-output ratio under the hypotheses of competitive markets, constant 
return to scale production function, substitution between factors and labor augmenting technical 
progress, the so called SK schedule. This schedule is particularly useful for the empirical analysis 
because it links labor share movements to the variations of an observed variable. The relation, 
moreover, is unaltered by changes in factor prices (wage and rental cost of capital), in quantities and 
by labor augmenting technical progress. These variations result in movements along the SK 
schedule.  
This setup represents a natural benchmark for the characterization of the long run 
equilibrium of the economy, yet relaxing some of the previous assumptions, also allows the study of 
the short and medium run. Following Blanchard (1997), the medium run is characterized by 
monopolistic competition in the market for goods and services and by the bargaining between firms 
and workers in the labor market. Firms thus, earn positive profits and have rents which they share 
with their employees. This means that the price of final goods and services is equal to marginal 
costs plus a markup, and that the wage rate differs from labor productivity. Factor proportions,   8
moreover, are varied without incurring any costs. As for the short run, it is characterized by 
adjustment costs and no variations in the capital-output ratio. 
According to Bentolilla and Saint Paul (1998, p. 4), what we can learn from analyzing the 
SK schedule is that “[a]ny change in the labor share which shows up as a deviation from that 
relationship   must arise from a shift in labor demand which is not due to real wages, capital 
accumulation, or labor-augmenting technical progress and, therefore, has to be explained by other 
factors”
7... The description of factors that permanently displace the schedule is included in the long 
run analysis. The role of market imperfections which temporarily put the economy off schedule is 
investigated when the medium and short run are presented. 
 
3.1.1   Long Run Analysis 
 
Let us consider how the SK  schedule is derived from a general production function 
() B L K F Y ⋅ , =  where Y  is total output, K  and L are respectively capital and labor stocks 
employed in the production process, and B  is labor augmenting technical progress
8. The constant 
return to scale property permits the following intensive form:  
  () l f K
K
B L












=  is the ratio between labor in efficiency units and capital. 
Under the assumption that labor is paid its marginal product, the following equality holds: 
  W () l f B
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⋅ =  
where W is the wage rate in terms of the unique good of the economy. Labor share is then defined 
as:  
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Consider now the capital-output ratio:  





Since the function  () l f  is monotonic, it is also invertible and allows to define l as a function of k :  
                                                 
7 For instance “[…] factors which displace the schedule, such as changes in the price of imported materials or capital-augmenting technical progress, 
and those which put the economy off the schedule, by changing the gap between the shadow marginal cost of labor and the wage, such as changes in 
markups of prices over marginal costs, union bargaining power, or labor adjustment costs.”(ibidem) 
8 To simplify the matter, we use an aggregate approach. The disaggregated extension used in most empirical work follows in an immediate way by 
introducing a price-of-goods index.   9
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Substituting the previous expression in the equation of the labor share gives:  
  () () () k k h f k h S
'
L ⋅ ⋅ = 
defining the SK  schedule: the labor share SL is a one–to-one function of the sole capital-output 
ratio. 
The first derivative of  () k SL  after some passages, is:  














where, σ , is the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital



























The relation between labor share and capital output ratio crucially depends on this elasticity. 
In particular, assuming  () 0 ≤ l f
' '
, if  1 ≥ σ , i.e. if there is low complementarity between capital and 
labor, the SK  schedule has a negative slope. When there is strong complementarity and  1 < σ , the 
SK  schedule has a positive slope. Hence, according to this appoach, long-run variations in the 
equilibrium labor share across countries or sectors are explained by different steady state levels of 
the capital-output ratio combined with different elasticities of substitution between labor and 
capital. 
For further reference it is important to notice that “the weight of the evidence”
 10 suggests a 
value of  σ  significantly less than 1. 
A first relevant consequence is that the expected sign of capital-output ratio in regressions 
should be negative, contrary to what happened in most cases. 
Consider what happens if a shock permanently varies the parameters of the schedule. This is 
the effect for instance of capital-augmenting technical progress, expressed by parameter A, which 
causes the production function to become  ( ) B L A K f Y ⋅ ⋅ , = . The reformulated labor share function 
is then: 
                                                 
9 See Varian (1984) 
10 According to Chirinko (2008), who reviews the many studies that have attempted to estimate σ, the elasticity of capital-labor substitution, “the 
weight of the evidence suggests a[n absolute] value of σ in the range of 0.40 − 0.60.” (p.681) Recent studies supporting this conclusion are Klump, 
McAdam, and Willman (2008), Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (2007) and Smith (2008).   10
  ()( ) ( ) () Ak Ak h f Ak h k A S
'
L ⋅ ⋅ = , 
Variations in  A shift the SK  schedule. The same effect is obtained if imported intermediate 
goods,  I , are included in the production function  ( ) I B L K f Y , , = ⋅ . The labor share is no more a 
sole function of the capital-output ratio, but depends also on the real prices of I . 
 
3.1.2   Medium and Short Run Analysis 
 
In the short and medium run, markets are not perfectly competitive. Firms have market 
power and apply a markup over marginal production costs. Bargaining between firms and trade 
unions introduces a wedge between the marginal product of labor and the real wage. 
Market power determines the size of rents extracted from consumers. Workers’ bargaining 
power relative to that of employers establish how these rents are distributed between labor and 
capital. Both aspects affect the labor share size. Only over time, free entry on the goods market 
drives the markup to zero and restores perfect competition conditions also in the labor market since 
there are no rents to share between firms and workers. 
In this context, it is possible to define a medium run SK schedule for given levels of firms’ 
market power and of their bargaining power on the labor market. The analysis is based on 
Blanchard (1997 and 1998) which provides through a simple but effective framework, an 
exhaustive analysis building on the results of Caballero and Hammour (1998) and of Phelps (1994). 
The analysis studies a simple model of monopolistic competition where firms bargain with 
workers over the wage rate, W, but detain the right to manage their employment level. This means 
that first W is set and then firms adjust employment acting as wage-takers. Hence, labor demand can 
be derived from firms' first order condition:  
  () ( ) l f B W
'
⋅ + = 1 μ  
Since  () 0 < l f
' '
,  the labor demand function has the usual negative slope. 
The wage rate is set through an asymmetric Nash bargaining whose outcome is the solution 
of the following maximization problem where the parameter β  defines the relative power of 
workers with respect to employers:  
  ( ) ( )
o o
W V V Max Π − Π − + − log 1 ) ( log β β  
subject to:  
  () ( ) l f B W
'
⋅ + = 1 μ    11
which is the optimality condition derived from the next stage where firms decide their employment 
level. V is aggregate workers utility, Π stands for firm profits, and the superscript o  denotes the 
outside option. It is usually assumed that  0 =
o Π  while 
o V V −  is defined as:  
  ( ) [ ]L u W u V V
o o − − =  
where  () W u  is individual utility from labor income and 
o u  is the utility from fully consuming the 
individual leisure endowment. 
This setup can be summarized using the following labor supply (or offer price) schedule:  




such that  0 > L g  and  0 > β g . A labor market equilibrium, therefore, is characterized by: 











For given values of μ  it is possible to derive a SK  schedule defining a stable relation 
between  L S  and k  such that:  
  () () () k k h f k h S
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When a labor demand shock changes the value of the markup, the SK  schedule is shifted
11: 
















<0, a downward shift of the schedule occurs when μ increases. 
But, the labor market equilibrium requires: 
() ( ) 0 , ) 1 ( = + − β μ L g l f
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For fixed K, at any given point (L; β, μ), we have: 
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11An analysis of variations in μ  following labor demand shocks is included in Phelps (1994). More recently Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Melitz and 
Ottaviano (2008) studied the effects respectively of market concentration and openness to trade over the markup level.   12
normally positive. 
Consider now what happens following a change in the value of β . A rise in worker 
bargaining power increases W and decreases the employment level L until labor market equilibrium 



















This variation in factor prices W is associated with a movement along the SK  schedule 
towards a higher equilibrium value of k





, which normally should be positive. 
It is worth mentioning at this stage that this medium run set-up was built by Blanchard in 
order to explain the joint behavior of unemployment and labor share in Continental Europe since 
the 1970s. As we noted in the Introduction, the decline of the labor share in Europe was preceded 
by an upward shift during the 1970s. According to Blanchard (1998, p. 3) “The initial increase in 
unemployment, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, was mostly due to a failure of wages to 
adjust to the slowdown in underlying factor productivity growth. The initial effect was to decrease 
profit rates and capital shares. Over time, the reaction of firms was to reduce  capital accumulation 
and move away from labor, leading to a steady increase in unemployment, and a recovery of the 
capital share.” This story is considered “familiar, and in its broad outlines , not controversial.” 
Actually, if the available evidence on σ  can be applied also to Continental Europe since the 
1970s, the story could be correct as far as unemployment is concerned, but not for the behavior of 
factor shares. 
In real world economies adjustment costs are recognized as major determinants of labor 
share movement
13. In this context, they are deemed responsible for movements off the SK  schedule 
which take place in the short run during the transition between two medium run equilibria. An 
exhaustive analysis of their effects is provided by the influential work by Caballero and Hammour 
(1998) which introduces the hypothesis of putty-clay technology in the previous setting.  
Firms face an ex-ante technological menu at time t characterized by a CES production 
function with labor augmenting technical progress:  
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13See Blanchard (1997 and 1998) and Caballero and Hammour (1998).   13
This expression can be thought as the envelope of many Leontief production functions which 
represent the ex-post production possibilities of an individual firm. 
In the short run, the capital-labor ratio is fixed and a change in factor proportions is possible 
only over time when new investments replace old vintage capital. Labor demand thus is inelastic 
and trade unions are given the opportunity to extract rents from the wage setting process.  
A simple way to study this setting involves considering how the markup varies if workers 
bargaining power changes. Denote with l  and L  respectively the fixed values of the capital-labor 
ratio and of labor demand. Define then,  sr μ  as the equilibrium short run level for the markup such 





















As  β  increases (decreases),  sr μ  must decrease (increase) to restore the equilibrium in the 
labor market. The equilibrium level for the markup thus does not depend in the short run on the 
characteristics of the demand for the final goods but is determined in the labor market. 
Consider now what happens when a labor supply or a labor demand shock hits the economy 
if we allow for changes in initial labor supplied and differences from labor demand. The dynamics 
of the labor share during the transition is described by Blanchard (1997 and 1998), if adjustment 
costs are characterized by a convex function (which approximates the effects of a putty-clay 
technology), and if the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is greater than one.  
A labor-supply shock causing β to increase reduces labor supply for any given W. Since the 
instantaneous labor demand is vertical, the wage rate increases while the profit rate and  sr μ  
decrease. For any k  the labor share increases and the economy moves off the medium run SK  
schedule. The shift in the relative price of labor persuades the firms to pay the adjustment costs and 
to adopt a more capital intensive technology. This reduces workers' appropriation possibilities via a 
reduction in employment L allowing a recovery in profits. 
When the capital deepening process is over, the transition ends and the economy is left on 
the same medium run SK schedule with a higher capital-output ratio
14.  
This means that if  1 < σ  (as we should expect), L S  increases, while if 1 ≥ σ  the labor share 
decreases. Opposite effects derive from a reduction in worker bargaining power. The graphs below 
display the transition from inital to final equilibrium. 
                                                 






































Consider now the case of a shock on labor demand and suppose that μ  increases. The first 
effect is a downward shift of the medium run SK  schedule. This implies further that  μ μ < sr  and 
firms have the incentive to lower their capital labor ratio in order to reduce rent appropriation by 
workers. Therefore, L starts to decrease causing at the same time a decrease in l and an increase in 
k . If  1 ≥ σ  during the transition, the increase in unemployment and the decrease in l cause an 
increase in the capital share and in the profit rate. The latter element triggers capital accumulation 
and produces a recovery in employment in the medium run. If  1 < σ , the decrease in l triggers 
capital decumulation and enhances an increase in unemployment. In both cases, the economy ends 
on a lower SK  schedule with a higher capital-output ratio, and a labor share change that has the 




                                                 
15 Qualitatively similar results are obtained if the putty-clay technology is substituted with different adjustment costs. Giammarioli et al. (2002) for 
instance consider the role of firing and hiring costs in explaining the counter-cyclical behavior of the labor share over the business cycle. The 
discounted value of these costs introduces a wedge between marginal productivity of labor and the wage which ultimately affects the short run level 
of the markup. During a recession, the markup is reduced and the SK  schedule temporarily shifts upward, while the opposite occurs during an 
upswing. 
   15
The model introduced above provides a useful insight on labor share movements but has 
been subject to some criticism. In particular, the main drawback pertains to the description of the 
wage setting process. Two other objections also have been raised. 
The first deals with trade union behavior in the wage setting process. Rowthorn (1999) 
points out the fact that trade unions are myopic because they do not take into account the effect of 
wage setting over employment decisions of individual firms. He concludes that their objective 
function is not well specified.  
In his model, based on Layard et al. (1991), trade unions only care about those workers that 
are considered insiders at the time the bargaining process takes place. This differs with the previous 
setting where unions maximize the aggregate utility of people who are employed between two 
rounds of bargaining. A first consequence is that the probability of insider "survival" (i.e. the 
probability that a worker is not fired by her/his present employer) becomes pivotal in the bargaining 
process. The results in terms of labor share dynamics, however, do not differ significantly from 
those obtained in the standard setting if a change in the relative price of productive factors is 
considered. 
The second, concerns the special case of a transition toward a different productive 
technology, described in a recent paper by Acemoglu (2003), which develops a theoretical model 
where firms adopt both labor and capital augmenting technologies through R&D expenditures. 
Firms’ decision to invest in innovations which improve the efficiency of either type of factors, 
depends on the relative prices of capital and labor intensive intermediate goods. The R&D sector 
generates the relevant adjustment costs. 
Under the hypothesis that  1 < σ , it is possible to characterize a steady state equilibrium 
where firms invest only in labor augmenting technological change and the value of the labor share 
is steady. In particular, on a balanced growth path the ratio between labor and capital in efficiency 






 holds where z  is a positive constant. This is due to the fact that  A 
does not vary across time while capital and labor in efficiency unit grow at the same rate, implying 
further that l and k  are constant. 
In this context, capital augmenting technological process is generated only in the transition 
between different equilibria and produces the expected permanent shift in the SK  schedule. 
Different perturbations affecting the economy have different effects on labor share dynamics which 
depend on the type of R&D investments being triggered. This marks a difference with the models 
considered up until now where adjustment costs only have a temporary effect on the SK  schedule.   16
In particular, in case of an adverse labor supply shock, the economy moves temporarily 
along the SK  schedule and then, returns to the initial steady state equilibrium. In the short run, as 
the wage increases, employment falls for a given level of capital stock thus reducing the level of k  
and causing the labor share to increase. A decrease in the interest rate occurs slowing down capital 






 initially jumps because employment is reduced, but immediately after starts to 
decrease since the growth rate of B  exceeds that of K . The transition is over when interest rate, 
capital accumulation, and the growth rate of labor augmenting technical progress are back to their 
initial level. The economy ends up with a lower employment level but with the same capital-labor 
and capital-output ratios. 
If a favorable shock hits labor supply, the employment level and the interest rate increase. 
This supplies the incentives for the R&D sector to invest in new intermediate goods which improve 
the efficiency of capital stock. Initially, the level of k  drops together with the capital-labor ratio 
causing a decrease in labor share. During the transition, capital accumulation increases its pace and 





 ratio. As the interest rate 
decreases, the growth of the numerator also slows down until it reaches the equilibrium level where 
labor in efficiency unit and capital stock grow at the same rate. The adjustment process involves a 
change in  A which shifts the SK  schedule and leaves the economy with a higher employment level 
and a permanent increase in the equilibrium level of the labor share. 
 
3.2  Labor Share Dynamics with Productive Factor Complementarity  
 
The standard neoclassical production function allows the substitution between capital and 
labor. The adherence of this hypothesis to the conditions of real economies, however, is questioned 
and suggests the need to analyse in detail also models where factor substitution is not allowed and a 
SK schedule cannot be defined. 
This strand of literature has mainly focused on labor market regulation which plays a crucial 
role in income functional distribution specially after the upsurge of new phenomena related to the 
globalization process. In particular, increased market integration influences firm and consumer 
behavior and also affects labor share dynamics both directly and indirectly through its interaction 
with the economy’s regulative framework. 
An analysis of these factors is made using the general setting introduced by Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2003) which describes an economy where monopolistic competition prevails among a   17
given number of firms which are (randomly) matched with workers. The economy is populated by 
m  identical firms whose number is fixed in the short run. In the long run, entries of new firms are 
possible after paying a cost c, proportional to a firm’s output.  Firm i produces the final good  i Y  
according to the simple production function  i i N Y = , where  i N  is firm employment. 
Workers can supply either zero or one unit of labor implying that  i N  measures both total 
working hours and employment. There are L workers in the economy. Worker  j 's utility function 
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where  () m g η η =  such that  ()0 > m g
'  and η  is constant. This set-up is such that the effect of a 
larger number of products in equilibrium is shown to work only through the elasticity of 
substitution between them, η , and thus the demand elasticity for firm i’s goods. 
There are no means of saving and workers spend all their income on consumption. Worker j 
earns a labor income equal to  j jN W  where  j W  is the wage rate and  j N  equals 1 if he/she is 
employed and 0  otherwise. If worker j is unemployed he/she receives a variable payment which is 
a function of the unemployment rate, u , f(u) such that  ( ) 0 < u f
' . Nonlabor income  () P u f , thus 
decreases in the unemployment rate. Woker j’s budget constraint then is: 
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where  i P  is the price of product i and P  is a price index defined as follows: 
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Firms are run by individual entrepreneurs with the same utility function of workers. Income 
spent for consumption equals the nominal profit earned by firm i, i.e.: 
  ( ) i i i i i i i N W P N W Y P − − = 




 workers. This is an asymmetric Nash bargaining, where firm i's outside option 
is assumed to be zero and is defined by the following maximization problem: 
  ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) i i i i i
i i W N W P N u Pf W N Max − − + − log 1 log , β β    18
This specification corresponds to an efficient bargaining and involves the simultaneous 
definition of the wage rate and of the employment level. It is possible thus that, if rents are 
generated in the final goods market where monopolistic competition prevails, stronger workers 
obtain higher wages without suffering a decrease in employment. In equilibrium, a share β  of this 
rents accrues to firm i's employees whose real consumption wage (the wage in terms of the 
consumption basket), Wi /P, is: 
  Wi /P =(1-β)f(u)+β(Pi /P) 
In the price setting process, firm i, sets its relative price as: 
  ( ) [ ] ( ) u f m P P i μ + 1 = / 
where μ  is the markup over the reservation wage. The level of  ( ) m μ  depends on the absolute price 
elasticity for firm i's output which is equal to ( ) η −  and is defined as: 







implying that  ()0 < m
' μ . 
In the general equilibrium for the economy, all firms are identical and  1 = /P P i , so that: 










Therefore, when the markup increases, unemployment increases as well. Moreover, the following 
equality must hold: 
  () () [] u f u f
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The size of the labor share thus depends on parameters μ  and β , and responds to shocks on both  
the demand for goods and the labor market. A fundamental difference, however, arises between the 
short and long run because the level of the markup in the latter case is affected also by the total 
number of firms in the economy.  
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) focus on a specific class of shocks related to market 
regulation. Their model, however, is general enough to allow for alternative explanations. In 
particular, there are three sets of variables which can produce variations in the labor share: 
    • Globalization / Market integration 
    • Labor market regulation   19
    • Technology-policy interaction.  
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) focus on the first two elements and study labor share 
movements in the long and short run when two different circumstances occur: a reform of the final 
goods market which produces either higher integration or a reduction in the entry cost faced by 
potential entrants, and a deregulation of  the labor market which reduces workers’ bargaining 
power. 
A reform of the final goods market involves a labor demand shock which affects the markup 
and ultimately the amount of quasi-rents accruing to individual firms for a given level of β . Higher 
market integration increases competition between domestic and overseas firms and causes a rise in 
the price elasticity of demand. The parameter η  increases driving down the equilibrium level of the 
markup. In the short run this causes a rise in the wage rate, in employment and ultimately in the 
labor share. 
In the long run, however, the equilibrium level of μ  depends on the entry cost (for given 
β ). Rents accruing to firms must equal c in equilibrium due to the free entry condition implying 
that the number of firms adjusts in order to make the following equality hold: 













After market deregulation, the number of firms decreases to allow the markup to recover. This 
causes the labor share to remain unchanged in the long run. 
A regulatory intervention that reduces the level of c however, produces a permanent change 
in the equilibrium value of μ . A permanent increase in the labor share would then follow. 
Consider now what happens if labor market deregulation permanently reduces workers’ 
bargaining power and expands firms opportunities to appropriate the quasi-rents generated in the 
final goods market. In the short run, the wage rate decreases, employment remains constant and 
labor share shrinks. In the long run, the rise in the profit rate attracts new entrants causing a 
decrease in μ . 
The drop in β  thus, is completely offset by a lower markup. Total employment, however, 
increases, as does labor share. A trade-off arises between workers present condition and their future 
perspectives. 
Results qualitatively similar to those produced by a drop in β  are obtained if a positive exit 
option for firms is introduced in the bargaining process. These findings are provided by Jayadev 
(2007) who adopts a setting based on Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) and focuses on the effects of 
increased capital mobility.    20
In this model, capital is again absent and capital mobility is equivalent to firm mobility. The 
asymmetric Nash bargaining defining the equilibrium wage rate and employment level includes the 
option to relocate in other countries, a possibility of which firms take advantage if no agreement is 
reached with workers. The maximization problem is modified accordingly:  
  () ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] φρ β β
γ θ − − − + − i i i i r i
i i W N W P N W W N Max log 1 log ,  
The parameters θ  and γ  define the weights that trade unions place on employment and wages 
respectively. The variable ρ  is the return from relocation, and  1 ≤ φ  captures the effects of 
imperfect capital mobility. The chance to migrate enhances the possibilities of the firm to 
appropriate the rents generated in the final goods market and ultimately reduces labor share
16. In a 
slightly different setting where firms detain the right to manage their employment level, Choi 
(2001) obtains similar results by considering the role of foreign direct investments. FDIs offer more 
opportunity to increase firm profits abroad and ultimately increase firm bargaining power. 
The role of technical progress is investigated by Hornstein et al. (2007) who study the 
effects of labor-augmenting technical progress when the regulatory framework of the economy 
produces labor market frictions. This is what they define as technology-policy interaction. 
The model combines the assumptions of a Leontief / vintage capital production function and 
of capital-embodied, labor-augmenting technical progress, with a Diamond - Mortensen - Pissarides 
matching function for the labor market. In this setting, an increase in the rate of technological 
obsolescence causes a drop in the labor share through its effects on the Nash bargaining between 
workers and employers. A reduction in the value of unemployment, i.e. workers' outside option, 
occurs and simultaneously firms' threat point increases. 
Economies characterized by small frictions respond by adjusting  the equilibrium wage and 
the unemployment rate. In economies with sizeable frictions, the adjustment involves mainly 
quantities causing an increase in the duration of unemployment and a fall in the employment-
vacancy ratio. A further effect derives from the age structure of the firms operating in the economy. 
An increase in the growth rate of technical progress reduces the time span where firms generate 




3.3  International Trade and the Labor Share 
 
                                                 
16 This solution requires a constant absolute price elasticity σ  as in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz framework. 
17 Firms in their last period have a labor share which equals one.   21
We shall now consider a crucial determinant of labor share dynamics, i.e. variations in 
international trade patterns. In spite of its relevance, a clear relationship between international trade 
and labor share movements is not easily found. Referring to models with increasing returns to scale 
and imperfect competition or to models which focus on intrafirm differences in productivity and 
export within industries, we incur in major problems. Quoting Krugman (2008): " It is not clear 
however, how to apply the insights of either sets of ideas to the question of distributional effects of 
developing-country exports". Thus, to obtain definite results we shall, confine ourselves to the 
traditional models of perfectly competitive markets, whatever their merit. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin model indeed supplies unambiguous predictions over the determinants of 
labor share dynamics, if specific hypotheses are introduced. Assuming that developed countries are 
capital abundant, in a simple model with two goods and two factors, they specialize in the 
production of capital intensive goods. Increased trade with labor abundant developing countries 
leads to a decrease in the international price of labor intensive goods and to a reduction in the labor 
share, as predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. The validity of the initial assumption, 
however, is questioned by many studies starting from Leontief’s (1953) seminal contribution. 
A wider consensus exists over the statement that developed countries are abundant in human 
capital and export mainly skill-intensive goods. Less sophisticated goods are imported from 
developing countries. Several authors studied the effects of fragmentation,  offshoring and 
outsourcing in the production process adopting modified versions of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model
18.with the aim of providing a rationale for the observed increase in the wage gap between 
skilled and unskilled workers. Their results, however, are oftentimes contradictory
19. 
In this context, an increase in international trade causes the labor share of unskilled workers 
to shrink and that of skilled workers to increase. The net effect on the aggregate labor share thus is 
ambiguous. As a consequence, a clear insight is not easily derived from these models even though 
some of them could be re-framed using labor and capital instead. Nonetheless, some results are 
obtained within the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model, also if the specialization of developed and 
developing countries are defined in terms of skills. 
Consider a simple economy with two sectors, 1 and 2, respectively producing a skill 
intensive good and a non-skill-intensive good, and two productive factors: skilled (s) and unskilled 
(u ) labor. International trade leads to the equalization of good prices and more specifically causes 
the price of skill-intensive good  1 p  to increase in developed countries while that of good  2 p  to 
decrease. The reverse happens in developing countries characterized by an abundance of non-
skilled workers. 
                                                 
18See for instance, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), Arndt (1997), Feenstra and Hanson (1996). 
19An analysis of this issue is provided by Kohler (2003) whose results help explain the dynamics in the remuneration of different productive factors.   22
Let us focus now on the  adjustments in the labor share of a generic economy due to the 
effects of international trade. Consider the equations that define the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem
20. 
Variations in the world price of each commodity, hence in the unit cost are a weighted average of 
the changes in the two factor prices ( s W  and  u W ). The weights,  i j, θ  ( u s j , =,  1,2 = i ) are the 
distributive shares of the two factors in the sector concerned. The equations below describe price 
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Summing the two equations gives the variation in the average wage W of the economy: 
  2 1 ,2 ,2 ,1 ,1 ˆ ˆ = ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ = ˆ p p W W W W W u u s s u u s s + + + + θ θ θ θ  
Assuming full employment, if  0 < ˆ ˆ 2 1 p p +  holds, the aggregate labor share shrinks, if  0 ˆ ˆ 2 1 ≥ + p p , 
the labor share increases. 
In developed countries, therefore, whenever the proportional increase in the price of the 
skill-intensive good exceeds the proportional decrease in the price of the other good, international 
trade has a positive impact over the labor share. The reverse is true otherwise. In developing 
countries, in order to have an increase in the labor share, the proportional decrease in the price of 
the skill-intensive good must be lower than the proportional increase in the price of the other good. 
In order to test the reliability of the previous assumptions and of the latter results, a 
description of the pattern of trade between developed and developing countries is very useful. A 
recent paper by Krugman (2008) provides an accurate overview of the evolution of trade dividing 
the last thirty years in three distinct periods. 
A good approximation of the international trade pattern in the 70s is a situation where 
developing countries mainly exported primary and capital-abundant goods, while developed 
countries specialized in manufactured goods. During the 80s, the share of manufactured goods on 
total export from developing countries increased and international specialization was mainly 
defined by the relative endowment of human capital, i.e. skilled labor.  
The period from 1980 to circa 2005 is split in two. In the first phase, international trade was 
characterized by limited volumes and mainly involved countries whose wage gap with developed 
countries was wide but not extreme. Exports from developing economies moreover mainly involved 
non-sophisticated goods, i.e. were concentrated in the less skill-intensive sectors. 
After the late 90s, a major transformation in the international trade pattern can be observed. 
Export volumes from developing countries increased steeply and new actors appeared on the scene, 
                                                 
20See Jones and Neary (1984).   23
China on top of the list, widening the wage gap with developed countries. Furthermore, the 
sophistication of exported goods increased now also involving skill-intensive sectors, the electronic 
industry in particular. 
This apparently puzzling evidence has given rise to a debate over the true nature of the 
observed increase in export sophistication of developing countries. A first view supported by 
Lawrence (2008) considers this information as the evidence of an actual transformation in the 
pattern of international trade. Krugman (2008) argues on the contrary that it is just a statistical 
illusion due to a lack of detailed data on the factor contents of trade. 
According to Krugman's interpretation of available data on specialization within industries 
(in particular vertical specialization), developing countries are taking over labor-intensive portions 
of skill-intensive sectors. No qualitative change is thus occurring in the pattern of trade between 
developed and developing economies whose specialization respectively remain in skill-intensive 
goods and in labor-intensive goods. 
Providing a description of the effects of international trade over the labor share is a hard task 
and requires a considerable simplification of the analysis. Nonetheless, some general conclusions 
can be drawn based on the description of the trade patterns given by Krugman (2008). 
During the 70s, international trade was likely to negatively affect the labor share of 
developed countries whose abundant factor was capital, while positively that of developing 
countries. In the following decade, variations in the labor share depended upon the changes in the 
relative prices of skill-intensive and non-skill-intensive goods. The same relation holds also form 
more recent dynamics if Krugman's statement regarding the evolution of the trade pattern is deemed 
correct. In this context the steep increase in the wage gap and in the volumes of trade are likely to 
negatively affect the labor share of developed countries
21. If, however, Lawrence’s (2008) thesis is 




4 Empirical  Evidence 
 
4.1  A Brief Overview 
 
Before attempting an interpretation of the main findings of the recent empirical literature on 
labor share dynamics, it is useful to consider the evolution of this variable as it emerges from the 
                                                 
21 But not necessarily the wage bill, given the likely reduction of surplus labor. Cf. Boggio, 2009.   24
EU-KLEMS data set. To this aim we provide some figures which display labor share movements 
both at the aggregate level and for a broad sectoral classification of the gross value added in the 
most important industrialized countries. By common practice (see Section 2), an adjusted labor 
share is calculated by imputing a notional wage to the self-employed equal to the average 
compensation per employee. In order to give a purely indicative measure of the trend, a continuous 
growth rate is derived regressing the logarithm of each series with a constant and a time trend.  The 
coefficients associated to the latter variable with its standard deviation are reported in Table 1. 
Initially, we compared the dynamics of unadjusted and adjusted aggregate labor share in 
Europe and the U.S. from 1970 (1977 for US) to 2005 (Figure 1). Simple graphic inspection reveals 
that a declining trend starts in the 1980s both in the EU15 (-0,2%) and in the US, but it is much less 
severe (-0,08%) and with a clear bump centred in 2000, in the latter case. Adjusted labor shares 
show clearly the presence of a downward drift and their decline appears steep (-0,4% in EU15 and -
0,14% in the US) in both areas. The dynamics in the two regions however, remain quite different.  
In order to get rid of the effects of the business cycle
22 and to study the medium run 
dynamics, we focused on 5-year moving averages for the adjusted labor share. No variations in the 
observed patterns were recorded (Figure 2). The relative stability of U.S. factor shares is a well 
known result, noted among others, by Poterba (1997). According to his findings, during the 1990s 
the rates of return on corporate assets rose while the capital/output ratio declined. Factor shares thus 
remained quite stable, especially if compared with those of EU countries.  
Let us now  investigate to what extent a sectoral change can explain the observed decline in 
the aggregate wage share. Indeed this aspect seems very important to explain such a decline and 
most of it seems to derive from an increase in the relative size of low labor share sectors compared 
to the aggregate country value added. A first argument in favor of this interpretation is found 
comparing the market economy and manufacturing (excluding electrical) labor shares in EU15 and 
in the US (Figure 3). A picture quite different from that of Figure 1 emerges. In fact, the US 
manufacturing labor share drops (-0,64%) much more than the European one (-0,17%), which in  
addition, presents a bump in the first part of the 90s. The reverse is true for the market economy 
labor share, falling more in the EU15 (-0,3%) than in the US (-0,15%), see Table 1. Services thus 
play a major role in the diverging patterns of the EU15 and the US, as also confirmed by the 
country analysis presented below. 
A recent paper by Young (2006) points in the same direction, and following the seminal 
work by Solow (1958), considers the labor shares of 35 US industries. Using data from 1958–1996,  
by decomposing changes in the time series into the “within-” and “between-industry” and 
                                                 
22 Gianmarioli et al. (2002) analyzing EU countries and the US from 1960-1998 find that the labor share varies counter-cyclically.   25
“covariance” components
23, reveals that the stable evolution of US aggregate labor share hides 
major changes. In particular, the drop in the manufacturing labor share – much larger than the 
European one – is compensated by the increase in both the share of services in total value-added 
and their wage share, so that they contribute a 10 percent increase in aggregate labor share.  
According to De Serres et al. (2001) moreover, the effects of the shifts in the sectoral 
composition of the economy accounts for a significant portion of the decline in aggregate wage 
shares of five European countries and of the United States
24. The observed downward trend starting 
in the mid-1980s is partially due to a shift from manufacturing to services; especially the financial, 
insurance and business services having a relatively low wage share. Similarly, Moral and Genre 
(2007), decomposing the labor share of the Euro Area using data at a 31 industry level for the 
period 1980-2004, show that a structural change took place and contributed to the fall in the 
aggregate labor share. The authors also calculate a counterfactual series resulting from an 
aggregation of the industry labor shares where corresponding weights are held constant at their 
1980 levels. This series presents a less marked decrease again reflecting the increasing importance 
of low wage share sectors and/or the relative decline of high share sectors.
25.  
A further issue that affects the labor share in different industries, but has received little 
attention in literature, is the relationship between the labor share pattern of manufacturing industries 
and the evolution of countries’ effective exchange rate, a crucial factor of firms’ competitiveness in 
globalized markets. Looking at the dynamic of effective exchange rates in Figure 4, a watershed is 
found in the second part of 1990s, from which a diverging pattern between dollar and euro arises 
(the dollar /pound exchange rate followed a pattern very close to the dollar/euro one, and afterwards 
maintained that pattern on average). The initial appreciation of the effective U.S. exchange rate is 
accompanied by a drop in the manufacturing labor share while the subsequent depreciation of the 
exchange rate corresponds to a small recovery and to a stabilisation of the trade shares. UE 
evidence, however, is more ambiguous. It seems quite evident that, as the shift of comparative 
advantages in the international trade of goods gives rise to winners and losers, also activities such as 
outsourcing or outward foreign investment could cause net gain or losses for different groups. 
Let us explore in more detail the labor share dynamics in seven industrialized countries 
(USA, UK, Italy, France, Germany, Spain and Japan) and in one newly industrialized country 
(Korea) adopting a decomposition of the gross value added in Manufacturing (excluding electrical), 
further disaggregated into its three main subcategories (consumer goods, intermediate goods and 
investment goods – excluding hightech), Electrical, Market and non Market Services.  Figures 5 to 
                                                 
23 See also Foster et al. (2001), 
24 Based on that affirmation, the authors warn about the small effect of real wage moderation policies on employment gains and structural 
unemployment drops, hence their negative impact on labor share. 
25 Confirmed also by the findings of Lawless and Whelan (2007), based on UE data for the period 1979-2001   26
12 display the corresponding 5-year moving average for each country’s labor share (figure 5-12). 
Table 2 reports the continuous growth rate of each time series (standard error in parenthesis). 
Some observations are worth mentioning. First, contrary to conventional wisdom but 
consistent with previous evidence on exchange rates, the two Anglo-Saxon economies display 
different labor share dynamics (Figure 5-6). In fact, the fall in the US manufacturing labor share is 
the steepest in our country sample (-0,64%) while this variable is roughly constant in the UK (Table 
2). Moreover, the US negative trend is confirmed also for the consumer (-0,71%) and intermediate 
goods (-0,78%) sectors, while only in the investment goods sector, labor share appears to be 
declining (-0,71%) in the UK. 
Next, considering countries in the Euro Zone, Italy’s manufacturing labor share displays a 
decline (-0,34%) that is mainly concentrated in the consumer and intermediate goods sectors (-
0,48% and -0,45% respectively) see Figure 7. Finally, among other countries, only the labor share 
of the consumer goods sector in France declines (-0,48%) see Figure 8, while in the remaining 
cases, manufacturing labor share appears roughly constant or sometimes rising, as in Spain, and in 
the two Asian economies, Japan and Korea (Figure 9-12). It is striking to find that the declining 
trend of manufacturing labor share often is heavily affected by its dynamics in the electrical sector, 
that – we must stress – includes electronics. Almost every country displays a declining trend in this 
industry, except Germany, UK and Korea. The observed drop is higher than in other manufacturing 
industries, for example, -1,1% in Italy and -0,8% in the US (Table 2). 
The labor share of the service sector, which contributes greatly to the value added of 
industrialized countries, unambiguously reveals a generalized drop affecting both market and non-
market services, with the relevant exception of the US - see above – and the UK (market services). 
Table 2 displays the fall in the labor shares of the Italian market and non-market service sectors (-
0,67% and -0,64%) nearly doubling that experienced in manufacturing. An even steeper decline is 
recorded in France (-0,73% and -0,77%)
26. 
Azmat et al. (2007) decompose labor share dynamics into ‘within’ and ‘between’ industry 
variations on a sample of eight industrial countries from 1975 to 1998, and find that variations 
                                                 
26 The relevance of variations occurring at the industry level is confirmed also by other papers. According to Torrini’s (2005a) analysis of the Italian 
case, from the beginning of the 1990’s, the manufacturing capital share shows only a moderate rise deriving from the combined conflicting effects of 
a modest increase in productivity, more intense competition from abroad, and the wage restraint which followed the 1992 agreements. In the network 
industry on the contrary, the capital share displays a strong growth, due to privatizations which enhance efficiency without leading to significant 
declines in a firm’s market power.  
These findings are confirmed also by Torrini (2005b) who points out that the observed differences among Italian industries, are mainly due to 
different exposures to international competition. As a result, no industry within the business sector has a fall in profit share higher than manufacturing, 
while within the non-manufacturing sectors, those of energy, transport and communication, and finance, where privatisation processes were 
intensified, display a major shift in rent distribution from wages to profits. 
Dealing with this issue, Giovannetti and Quintieri (2007) focus on the links between globalization, international specialization, wages and 
employment in order to explain the main differences between Italy and other industrialized countries. The bulk of the fall in the aggregate labor share, 
-13% in the period 1977-2003, is due to variations within sectors (6/10) and the rest (4/10) to variations between sectors. It appears that Italian 
industries in the international markets of traditional goods faced competitors from emerging countries by rising the average value of exported goods. 
Outsourcing and outward foreign investment however, did not cause an improvement in Italy’s sectoral specialization; instead an increase in skilled 
labor demand is observed for which product upgrading and specific know-how could be likely explanations.   27
within the manufacturing share of the value added have sizeable effects. There is room, thus, for 
explaining an important part of the drop in labor share also through industry specific dynamics, 
particularly in the network industry. By focusing on labor share determinants in industries 
(electricity/gas, telecommunications, mail and transports), the authors show that privatizations are a 
major cause of the labor share decline. It appears that the impact of privatizations has more than 
offset the negative effect on the capital share due to the increase in product markets competition. 
Finally, as suggested by the results derived from a finer industry disaggregation (Table 2), 
variability at the industry level might be a source of the decline in aggregate labor shares as 
important as country variability. Lawless and Whelan (2007), using sectoral data from 1979-2002 
for sixty sectors and eight countries, show that aggregate changes are coherent with a sector-based 
explanation more than a country-based one. Two elements work in this direction. First, a 
(permanent) drop in manufacturing employment in industrial countries is particularly important in 
sectors more exposed to international competition (OECD 2005, Baldwin 2006).
27 Second, the 
evidence provided by the IMF (2007), re-inforces the former: “Global Labor Supply” calculated by 
weighting the working age population in each country by the country’s export share of GDP is now 
four times greater than in 1980, mainly because of the increasing contribution of  China, India and 
the former USSR. 
The effects of FDI on employment dynamics in advanced countries are also studied: firms’ 
enhanced mobility due to the globalization process represents an effective threat for workers who 
fear to lose their job, and are forced to accept lower salaries in the bargaining process. The impact 
of these variables, however, should be modest since FDI flows from North to South are still small 
(about 4% of Northern domestic investments) as pointed out by Glyn (2006). Moreover, these 
findings are far from clear-cut
28.  
 
4.2  A Synthesis and an Interpretation of Regression Results 
 
Before presenting the empirical results on labor share dynamics, it is useful to sum up the 
major features shared by the papers reviewed. Panel regression, even if with different estimation 
                                                 
27 The US have recently displayed a decline in service employment - IT sectors included -, increasing the concern about off-shoring activities. 
However, the evidence for UE countries is mixed (see Giovannetti and Quintieri 2007). According to Baldwin (2006), a crucial role is played by 
growing international competition between individual workers performing similar tasks in different nations..Hence, the analysis should focus on the 
degree of “tradability” of services instead of other characteristics such as job skills or educational requirements. Tradability obviously is low for 
“personal services” in which physical presence and/or face to face proximity with the user is needed.  
28 It appears that during the period from 1983 to 1996, the rise in outward investment in U.S. manufacturing industries caused a reduction in the wage 
premium that union members shared (Choi, 2001). Harrison and McMillan (2006) find that notwithstanding the overall contraction in US 
manufacturing employment of multinational firms (both for parents and for affiliate firms), the correlation between employment within multinational 
firms in the US and abroad is positive when the affiliate is located in high income countries while it becomes negative when the affiliate is located in 
low income countries. But the findings of Federico and Minerva (2007) on Italy’s outward foreign direct investments (FDI) between 1996 and 2001 
for 12 manufacturing industries do not support the conjecture that outward investment is detrimental to local employment growth in the home 
country.  
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methods, is the methodology most often used. The most common sample includes industrial 
countries observed over a time period ranging from 1960s/1970s to the beginning of 2000s. Only a 
few papers study over a hundred countries – see below. The dependent variables estimated are labor 
share or its complement to one – the profit share, often adjusted according to the methods described 
in Section 2. Data is derived from the following data bases: EU-KLEMS, EC-AMECO, OECD 
STAN and ISDB, UN-NASD and UNIDO. Most of the results concern aggregate labor shares, but 
few authors focus on data disaggregated by industries (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 2003, Moral and 
Genre 2007, Hutchinson J. and Persyn D. 2009) or by skills (Daudey and Decreuse 2006, IMF 2007 
and Jaumotte F. and Tytell I. (2007), DGE_EU 2007). 
Building on the information derived from the theoretical literature, three main groups of 
variables are identified representing the main determinants of labor share dynamics: technical 
progress, globalization, product and labor market regulation. Their actual relevance is assessed on 
the basis of the findings in current literature. Leaving strictly methodological considerations and 
variable definitions aside, result robustness is critically tested controlling each paper’s availability 
of average data for multiple periods and instrumented checks.  
The rate of technological progress is widely considered as the main factor which 
contributes to the decline of the labor share, but the evidence for industrial countries is still scant 
and sometimes indirect. A major drawback is the lack of data which does not allow a direct   
measurement of the effects of technical progress on capital stock. Equally difficult is the assessment 
of the impact of interactions between technological advances and capital goods increases, going 
beyond the information provided by the series of ICT in capital stock. Furthermore, any 
measurement of the rate of technical progress has to be treated as endogenous. Not surprisingly, a 
linear time trend is often used as a proxy for the impact of technical progress growth rate on the 
labor share: its effect is negative and significant when directly estimated (Ellis and Smith, 2007)
29 
but very similar evidence is found also when it is adopted as a control variable for more in-depth 
analyses. 
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) - in an influential paper spelling out, as we saw above, the 
theoretical relationship between capital-output ratio and labor share - study the role of technical 
progress by means of a disaggregated analysis covering 13 industries and 12 countries over the 
1972-93 period. Their findings show that the estimated coefficient of total factor productivity is 
negative. However, according to their theoretical analysis, if total factor productivity is strictly 
                                                 
29 Cf. below what is noted about the findings of Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003, p. 22), IMF, 2007 and Daudey and Decreuse (2006). Ellis and Smith 
(2007), by means of the analysis of the profit share in a group of industrial countries (1960-2005), investigate the role of technology by including in 
their estimates a linear time trend starting in the mid 1980s. This indirect method defines a positive and significant coefficient for the trend in the 
profit share if certain standard control variables are considered. The coefficient, however, becomes insignificant in the fully-specified model where 
the interactions between the time trend and product and labor market regulation scores are considered. Among the control variables included in the 
regression, GDP growth, which is intended to proxy business cycle, has a positive and significant effect on the profit share.   29
capital augmenting, the associated coefficient must have the same sign of the capital-output ratio; 
this feature holds for most, but not all sectors. Most importantly, qualitatitivly similar results are 
found using a linear trend to approximate technical progress.
30  
In the study of European Commission 2007
31 if ICT variables are included among the 
regressors and the labor share is disaggregated by skills, technology together with the capital to labor 
ratio explains the bulk of the decline in the labor share. According to IMF, 2007
32 non-linear effects 
of ICT are required, because of the non-linearity of learning requirements and robustness improves 
if the ICT share of investments is used instead of the capital stock, but again the coefficients 
become insignificant when time trends - whose effects on the labor share are negative - are added.  
Moral and Genre (2007) using different proxies for technology
33, support the view that 
technical change has a negative and significant impact on labor share. 
A complete description of the effects of technology, however, should not overlook the 
different role played by (lagging) labor productivity on the wage share, before and after the mid 
1980s, because its impact is first positive and then negative (Guscina, 2006).
34 These results are 
robust to the use of average data calculated on different time periods. Therefore, as confirmed in 
other papers based on Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), technical change appears to shift from a 
labor augmenting type to a capital augmenting one after the mid 1980s.  
Dealing with globalization, one wonders if, contrary to the conventional wisdom, trade 
variables played an important role in explaining the fall in labor share. This remark is particularly 
surprising because trade series are available for most countries and suffer from less drawbacks than 
data on technical change. Descriptive statistics on declining labor shares and on trade variables 
suggest a possible reason why the empirical evidence is so scant; the timing of the change in trends 
of these two sets of variables is in fact, a major problem. In general terms, the trade share with 
                                                 
30 Other studies followed Bentolila and Saint Paul (2003) introducing the capital/output coefficient in their regression. Daudey and Decreuse (2006) 
focused on data from 11 countries for the 1970-2000 period, they found a negative and significant parameter associated to the capital to output ratio in 
an aggregate specification. However, the result is not robust to the inclusion of time dummies and of an index of R&D investments, suggesting that 
time dummies may proxy technical change better than the capital to output ratio. Furthermore, Hutchinson J. and Persyn D. (2009), which unusually 
estimate a first difference panel OLS with country-industries fixed effects and year dummies for the 1980-2001 period, found the same negative and 
significant sign for the capital-output ratio log and for total factor productivity coefficients. 
31 European Commission (2007) analyzes the effects of technology for 11 European countries, Japan and USA over the 1960-2006 period; the 
coefficient of the ICT use log is negative but not significant in the aggregate specification. It turns out statistically significant after disaggregating the 
labor share by skills. Its coefficient is negative for low-skilled workers and positive for the high-skilled. The coefficient absolute value is greater in 
the first case. Variations in the log of the capital to labor ratio are always statistically significant, with a positive sign for the labor share of medium 
and high skilled workers (and also for the total) and a negative sign for that of the low-skilled. 
32IMF (2007) studies the labor share of 18 countries over the 1982-2002 period (see also Jaumotte F. and Tytell I. (2007) for qualitatively similar 
results). Adding ICT capital and ICT capital squared among the regressors, it turns out that the effects of technical progress on labor share are non-
linear because of the non-linearity of learning requirements. The robustness of ICT coefficients is improved if they are measured as a share of total 
investments instead of capital stock. Nonetheless, the effect of technology remains negative, and has a smaller impact in advanced sectors. The labor 
to capital ratio coefficient is positive and significant only in the specification with fixed effects that excludes labor market variables, and has an 
elasticity of 0,055. But it is not significant in the instrumental variable specification. 
33 Approximated by ICT capital services, R&D investment (%GDP) or number of patents. 
34To disentangle the effects of technical progress before the globalization/ITC-revolution era and after, in his most sensible estimate, the author splits 
the time series in two periods using year 1985 as the pivotal date. Before 1985 a 1% increase in lagged productivity per worker increased the labor 
share by around 0,35 %, while after 1985 there was a 0,24% decrease. Including self-employment, the respective changes in the labor share amount to 
0,29% and -0,11%. The effect is even stronger when increases in (current) productivity per worker are considered. The use of lagged productivity and 
robustness checks (especially realized through the analysis of five period averages) is justified by the role played by technical change in the definition 
of labor share dynamics.   30
emerging economies started its upward trend in the 1990s. The positive trend in the profit share, and 
the corresponding declining trend in the labor share began in the 1980s. 
Different results are found using different proxies for openness. Splitting the sample at the 
mid eighties, as in Guscina (2006), reveals further that the impact of the trade to GDP ratio on the 
labor share becomes significant and negative only after 1985. Adjusting the labor share to account 
for self-employment, returns a negative and significant coefficient also in the first period, but causes 
the ratio of trade to GDP to have a lower impact in the second period.
35 The degree of openness to 
trade of the euro area with respect to non-EU 15 countries seems not to be robust to alternative 
specifications in Moral and Genre V. (2007), as well as for the 11 countries considered by Daudey 
and Decreuse (2006). According to the results of Ellis and Smith (2007), an appreciation in the real 
effective exchange rate enhances the profit share. Moreover, as expected, the impact of relative 
export and import prices on labor share are respectively negative and positive (IMF, 2007). The 
impact of off-shoring on the aggregate labor share is negative and significant. Quite surprisingly, 
when disaggregating by skills, this result is confirmed for skilled labor only. Immigration moreover, 
is found to have a negative impact (IMF, 2007). 
The empirical evidence concerning product and labor market regulations appears quite 
inconsistent because, among the independent variables tested, only a few are statistically robust and 
display the expected sign. In this context, it is worth mentioning that bargaining variables have 
strong interactions with technical progress proxies as emerges from panel regression results. In fact, 
the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients often depend on the proxy used for technical 
change. These findings probably suffer from problems of multicollinearity and endogeneity among 
independent variables and from a lack of instrumented analysis. 
The impact of employment protection on the labor share, when significant, is positive but 
small in Guscina (2006), while it is positive and significant in all specifications in Moral and Genre 
(2007). Adopting disaggregation by skills results in a negative and significant effect in all cases for 
high-skilled labor; whilst it is only barely significant for low-skilled labor (European Commission 
(2007). What is more surprising, however, is that in Ellis and Smith (2007) the impact of 
employment protection legislation on the profit share is positive and significant. Moreover, both 
European Commission (2007) and IMF (2007) find a negative and significant impact of 
unemployment benefits on the labor share, although its impact is found small in the second paper. 
However, the effect of minimum wage legislation on the aggregate labor share is positive and 
significant in Daudey and Decreuse (2006). 
                                                 
35For a 1% increase in trade openness, the labor share declines 0,14% after 1985. If the self employed are considered, the coefficient turns out to be 
negative and significant before 1985 (-0,21), with its value decreasing in the second period (-0,17). These results do not provide much support to the 
argument of a globalization driven reduction of the labor share, coherent with the standard Hecksher-Ohlin explanation.   31
As for the effects of union density, they are not significant in European Commission 
(2007), while in Daudey and Decreuse (2006) the impact of the degree of unionization is positive 
and significant. In Moral and Genre (2007), union density has a positive and significant effect only 
when using ICT capital services as a proxy of technical change. What is more puzzling however, is 
that, accoding to European Commission (2007), its impact becomes negative and significant for 
low-skilled workers, and positive but not significant for medium and high-skilled agents as well as 
for the aggregate.  
Product market regulations show mixed effects. An increase in its strictness lowers the 
income share of the high-skilled workers and raises the income share of the low and medium-skilled 
workers – albeit not very significantly in the case of the medium-skilled workers. The net effect of 
an increase in the strictness of product market regulation on the aggregate labour income share is 
positive, but not very significant (European Commission (2007)). In Ellis and Smith (2007) the 
product market regulation score negatively affects the profit share but its coefficient is not 
significant. Excluding the terms of interaction the impact becomes positive and statistically 
significant.  
The previous findings concern industrial countries and require to be complemented by more 
evidence covering a larger sample of countries. This should provide a better description of the 
impact of globalization variables. In this context, data limits concerning technical change and labor 
market bargaining force us to mainly focus on the effects of trade variables. Notwithstanding the 
previous caveat, the following findings are worth being noticed. Descriptive statistics on the labor 
share of developing countries have recorded a decline over the past three decades. According to 
Harrison (2002), developing countries experienced a yearly 0.1 point decrease in labor share from 
1970 to 1993 and a 0.3 point decrease from 1993 to 1996. For all countries in the sample, however, 
the main labor share determinant is the rise of capital stock relative to the labor force, interpreted as 
a proxy for the level of development (Harrison 2002).
36  
Developing countries have become increasingly open to foreign trade and to capital flows 
over time. The impact of trade openness is negative, as proven by the negative correlation between 
the share of trade in GDP and labor share, and is magnified in poorer countries (Ortega and 
Rodriguez 2002, Rodrik 1998, Harrison 2002). A negative impact on labor share is also found for 
                                                 
36In a recent paper (Jayadev, 2007), the GDP per capita log is found to have a positive and significant effect on the labor share. It surprisingly 
accounts for a large part of the variance of the sample. Ortega and Rodriguez (2002) in their cross-country analysis find that from the beginning of 
1990s, a statistically negative correlation between capital share and per capita income exists. These results based on survey data are consistent with 
the evidence derived from national accounts. Among control variables, drops in government spending are found to have a negative effect on labor 
share as well as large devaluations in the exchange rate (Lee and Jayadev 2005, Harrison. 2002).   32
foreign direct investment (Harrison 2002) and for the stock of inward FDI in percentage of GDP for 
most LDCs (Decreuse B. and Maarek P. 2008).
37  
Rodrik (1997) argues thus, that globalization increases the relative mobility of capital vis-
à-vis labor. As the empirical evidence shows, capital account openness deteriorates the labor share 
because it reduces workers’ bargaining power. Its net effect results from the interaction between 
‘direct effects’ such as outsourcing, global production sharing and the threat of capital flight, and 
‘indirect effects’ due to the increase of elasticity in labor demand. As a consequence, the economy 
faces larger variations in wage and employment when a demand or a productivity shock occurs. 
Countries without effective capital account restrictions display lower wages (Rodrik 1998). A 
positive effect on labor share results, however, from capital controls (Lee and Jayadev 2005). In the 
end, capital mobility in general appears to reduce labor share – except in low-income countries 
where the positive effect is not significant (Jayadev, 2007). 
Some additional evidence for developing countries stresses the relevant role played by the 
crises that followed the capital account liberalization of the 1990s. Such episodes appear to 




4.3 Concluding  Remarks 
 
Let us here try to highlight the main findings of the previous review of econometric works. 
First, there is evidence showing a negative and significant impact of technical change on labor 
share; but often qualitatively similar results are found using a linear trend to approximate technical 
progress. 
Second, a negative effect of globalization variables on labor share is clearly brought out for 
developing countries, whilst it is not as clear for advanced countries since the results’ robustness 
changes if different proxies are used. One possible reason for this paradox is the existence of a ten-
                                                 
37Foreign direct investments are found to have a negative impact on the labor share (Harrison, 2002). To assess the role played by FDI on income 
distribution in developing countries, Decreuse. and Maarek (2008) analysed a panel of countries whose GDP per capita was 60% or less than that of 
the US in 1980. They analysed the impact of the stock of inward FDI in percentage of GDP in the manufacturing sector. Using fixed effects with time 
dummies and controls for endogeneity and autocorrelation bias as well as different proxies for globalization, a non monotonic relationship is found 
between the labor share and the ratio of FDI stock to GDP. This supports the hypothesis that two opposing effects derive from inward FDI: a negative 
one due to market power and technological advance and a positive one due to increased competition between firms in the labor market. Nevertheless, 
the threshold above which labor shares start increasing with FDI is too high to include other countries beyond Hong-Kong, Ireland, Macao, and 
Singapore. The impact of FDI however, is quite large: an increase of one standard deviation in the ratio of FDI on GDP for a country having a mean 
value of this ratio implies a fall in the labor share between 4% and 7.5%. 
38Firstly, Diwan (2001) points out the strong negative impact of exchange rate crises on the labor share, defined as a situation where within a year the 
nominal exchange rate depreciates by 25%. He warns against the long lasting effects of the decline, after the peak of the crises, which causes the labor 
share to remain below its average in the following years. This negative effect moreover, appears to be cumulative if crises are repeated, resulting in a 
permanent drop of the labor share. 
Next, Onaran (2005) considers the evolution of the manufacturing wage share in ten developing countries. His results reveal a long lasting effect of 
crises in all countries which cause a fall in labor share whose magnitude is much larger than the decline in GDP. Contrary to GDP dynamics, in most 
countries the labor share remains below its previous level after the crisis, even though the expected reduction in unemployment does not occur. These 
findings seem to confirm that the link between increased capital mobility and stagnation in aggregate demand enhanced by tight fiscal and monetary 
policies, can shift the bargaining power against labor and produce cycles that increase the frequency of crises.   33
year lag between the beginning of the declining trend in the labor share and the rising trend of 
globalization.  
Finally, product and labor market regulation issues have mixed effects on the labor share 
because among the independent variables tested, only a few are statistically robust and display the 
expected sign. A major problem in this context arises due to the strong interactions of bargaining 
variables with technical progress proxies. 
We also notice the rather surprising fact that unemployment is almost completely absent 
among the explanatory variables of the labor share used in the econometric works we surveyed
39 in 
spite of its obvious impact on workers bargaining power, hence on their wage demands and 
eventually their income share. A reason certainly is that unemployment is itself affected by the 
wage share. As is well-known, the neoclassical explanation of this causal link is rather simple: 
given a neoclassical production function, a higher (lower) wage share implies lower (higher) labor 
demand. But, other possible explanations exist within the context of a Leontief-type production 
function: first, the rate of accumulation, hence the level of employment, are inversely related to the 
wage share; second, if imperfect competition prevails on product markets, a wage share increase 
shifts the optimum to a position where less output is produced and less employment is demanded. 
Another fact to be stressed is that a clear explanation of labor share’s behavior in OECD 
countries (see Figure 13), that is rising in the 60s and 70s, and declining afterwards, is difficult to 
derive from the econometric work surveyed. 
In view of these observations, we shall follow a different approach to the problem: taking 
Blanchard (1998) as a starting point, we shall try to understand the process of interaction through 
time between unemployment and labor share. 
Let us again consider Blanchard’s description of the behavior of unemployment and labor 
share in continental Europe. For the reader’s convenience, we will repeat the description, which 
according to Blanchard (1998, p.3) – is considered “familiar, and in its broad outlines, not 
controversial”: “[t]he initial increase in unemployment, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, was 
mostly due to a failure of wages to adjust to the slowdown in underlying factor productivity growth. 
The initial effect was to decrease profit rates and capital shares. Over time, the reaction of firms was 
to reduce capital accumulation and move away from labor, leading to a steady increase in 
unemployment and a recovery of the capital share.” 
We objected to the last sentence since Blanchard’s (1998) model was based on a 
neoclassical production function; given that the elasticity of substitution is probably less than 1, the 
second alleged effect, namely “a recovery of the capital share” cannot take place. But, as noted 
                                                 
39 The only paper using unemployment is Daudey and Decreuse (2006) but only as a control variable.   34
previously, different causal links, expressing the effect of unemployment on wage share, can 
replace a neoclassical production function. 
We suggest that Blanchard’s descrition is useful in understanding what happened to wage 
shares and unemployment in the whole of OECD countries. To this end, we borrowed Figures 13 
and 14 as they are similar to those proposed by Blanchard but refer to the wider group of countries. 
They lend themselves to the same interpretation given by Blanchard for the smaller group. During 
the 60s and 70s – in presence of low unemployment – the wage share was rising, but the reaction of 
firms caused an increase in unemployment that during the 80s reached a much higher level and was 
mantained afterwards; as a consequence, the wage share since the mid-70s has been declining. 
The difficulty of disentangling this two-way simultaneous causation – togheter with the 
medium-long term nature of the phenomena – is probably what in our case made the econometric 
work rather deceiving vis-à-vis the main questions it confronted. 
We must also remark that trying to explain labour share behavior without introducing 
unemployment is almost like playing Hamlet without the Prince. 
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Labour's Share - average of 17 OECD countries 1960-2005(employee compensation adjusted for 
self-employment as % of GDP) 
Source: author’s calculations from OECD Economic Outlook Database 
From Glyn (2006), p.1 
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Source: OECD Economic Outlook 85 database; OECD calculations. 
From OECD (2009), p. 223. 
   57
 
Appendix: variable definitions and econometric methods (for Section 4.1) 
 
Guscina (2006) 
Sample: 18 industrial countries (1960-2000- subsample break 1985) 
Main Data Set: OECD STAN 
Dependent variable: labor share 
Dependent variable correction:  
Compensation share in national income: it includes share of wages and salaries, employer-financed 
benefits, unemployment insurance, social security, and workmen’s compensation in the national 
income.  
Employment share in national income also includes self-employment income (Johnson’s 
convention, 1954). 
Independent variable:  
(1) Labor productivity of total economy – GDP per hour worked, and productivity  
per worker – GDP to total employment ratio 
(2) Openess to trade – ratio of trade to GDP, trade share with developing countries, foreign direct 
investment to GDP ratio, ratio of capital flows to GDP 
(3) Union density – the percentage of unionized workforce,  Employment protection (index from 2 
– most restrictive to 0 – least restrictive) 
Statistical methodology: yearly panel regression with country fixed effect, five year perdiods 
average, level and first difference. 
 
Daudey and Decreuse (2006) 
Sample: eleven OECD countries (1970-2000) 
Main Data set: OECD 
Dependent variable: labor share 
Dependent Variable Correction: Gollin (2002) 
Independent variable:  
(1) Capital to Output ratio 
(2) Degree of openess 
(3) Minimum to median wage ratio, union density, the unemployment rate   58
Statistical methodology: panel regression with country fixed effect and common time dummies, 
yearly and five-year periods; instrumental variable estimation was used. List of instruments: the 
capital to output ratio and the unemployment rate are instrumented using their lags; GMM. 
 
IMF (2007) and Jaumotte F. and Tytell I. (2007) 
Sample: 18 countries (1982–2002) 
Main Data set: OECD STAN, UNIDO 
Dependent variable: total, skilled and unskilled labor share (based on the sectoral skill intensity) 
Dependent Variable Correction: Gollin (2002). 
Independent variable:  
(1) share in ICT capital and its squared of total capital stock, (log of) labor to capital ratio  
(2) Relative import price (log of), relative export price (log of), offshoring, immigration 
(3) Labor tax wedge – the sum of personal income tax and all social security contributions  
expressed as a percentage of the total labor cost. Unemployment benefit – the average of the 
unemployment benefit, replacement rates corresponding to multiple incomes, family, and 
unemployment duration situations. 
Statistical methodology: yearly panel regression using country fixed effects. Instrumental variables 
estimation was used. List of instruments: the share of government consumption in GDP; the 
consumption tax rate; the (log of) total population; the (log of) export-weighted real GDP of trading 
partners; the distance-weighted export adjusted employment in the rest of the world (a measure of 
the global labor supply); and lags of (logs of) relative trade prices, offshoring, and immigration. 
 
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) 
Sample: 13 industries and 12 countries (1972-93) 
Main Data set: OECD (ISDB) 
Dependent variable: labor share 
Dependent Variable Correction: Gollin (2002) and, in addition as Johnson (1954) 
Independent variable:  
(1) Total factor productivity index; Capital to Output ratio 
(2) Real price of imported oil 
(3) Labor conflict rate (number of strikes and lock-outs to employees in the preceding year ratio); 
Employment growth rate   59
Statistical methodology: yearly unbalanced panel data, both in level and first difference (Arellano 
and Bover’s (1995) system estimator). Instrumental variables estimation was used. List of 
instruments: lagged independent variables. 
 
European Commission (2007) 
Sample: EU-11, Japan and USA (1960-2006) 
Main Data set: AMECO, EUKLEMS 
Dependent variable: total labor share, low, medium and high-skilled labor share 
Dependent Variable Correction: none 
Independent variable:  
(1) ICT–intensity of production process; Labor to Capital ratio (inverse of) 
(2) Openness 
(3) Union density, unemployment benefit, Employment protection, labor tax wedge,  
minimum wage; active labor market policy 
Statistical methodology: yearly panel regression. 
 
Ellis and Smith (2007) 
Sample: Industrial countries, 1960-2005 
Main Data set: EC-AMECO 
Dependent variable: profit share 
Dependent Variable Correction: Profit share = (Gross Operating Surplus + income of uncorporated 
enterprise - wages of uncorporated enterprise) / (GDP – indirect taxes). 
Independent variables:  
(1) Broken linear trends (from 1985) as proxy for technological developments 
GDP growth 
(2) Emerging markets export share (China, India, nine EU accession countries). 
Real effective exchange rate, Oil price 
(3) Product market regulation score (index from 6 – most restrictive to 0 – least restrictive) 
Employment protection legislation score (index from 6 – most restrictive to 0 – least restrictive) 
Statistical methodology: yearly fixed-effect panel annual data regressions 
 
E. Moral and Genre V. (2007) 
Sample: Eight Euro Area countries 1970-2004, sectoral 
Main Data set: EU KLEMS    60
Dependent variable: labor share 
Dependent Variable Correction: Gollin (2002)  
Independent variables: 
(1) ICT capital services,  R&D investment (%GDP), number of patents, GDP growth. 
(2) Trade openess to non-EU15. 
(3) Employment protection legislation, Union density. 
Statistical methodology: yearly fixed-effect panel annual data regressions 
 
Hutchinson J. and Persyn D. (2009) 
Sample: EU countries 
Main Data set: EUKLEMS 
Dependent variable: labor share 
Dependent Variable Correction: Gollin (2002) 
Independent variables: 
(1) Log of capital/output ratio; log of total factor productivity 
(2) Log of intermediate prices; trade openness 
(3) Employment growth; log of foreign wages; industries level markups and concentration levels. 
Statistical methodology: yearly fixed-effect panel annual data regressions with annual time 
dummies; standardized coefficient. 